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TAX LOOPHOLES AS ORIGINAL SIN: LESSONS
FROM TAX HISTORY
GERARD

M.

BRANNONt

T

HIS paper deals with a number of fundamental problems in
the income tax. It looks at these from an historical point of
view and draws some lessons for tax reform and for future decisions on possible new taxes.
In 1976, President Carter stated that our tax system is a disgrace to the human race. Much of contemporary tax reform discussion has had a good-guy/bad-guy theme.' A similar tone has
characterized many of President Reagan's speeches which depict
tax reform as a battle between people and interests.2 Despite the
perceived problems with the current tax structure, it remained
unchanged. It has been suggested that "maybe the biggest reason we haven't changed the tax structure, is that change has been
resisted at every point and is being resisted today by vested inter3
ests, those who profit from the status quo."
Some commentators have suggested that one problem with
the tax structure is that there have been many illogical special interest provisions enacted into tax law as a result of what can best
be called "political bribery." 4 In total, these are only a small part
t A.B. Georgetown University 1943, Ph.D. Harvard University 1950. Previously Director, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury; Economist, Joint Tax
Committee; Professor of Economics, Georgetown University, Staff Member,
American Council of Life Insurance. Previously an Economic Consultant.
1. See Bradley, Let's Have the "Fair Tax," 70 A.B.A.J. 12 (July 1984).
2. Reagan Renews Tax Reform Sales Pitch, 28 TAX NOTES 1165 (1985).
3. Id. at 1166; see also Bradley, supra note 1, at 16. Senator Bradley writes
that a fundamental purpose behind the "fair tax" reform legislation that is currently before Congress is to eliminate special-interest tax provisions that benefit
the few at the expense of higher rates for the majority. Id. However, "[n]ot
everyone supports [the] tax reform, no matter how clear its advantages are. The
special interests that benefit from tailor-made tax loopholes are hoping the idea
will simply die." Id.
4. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957). "Political bribery," as described by Professor Surrey, are those factors that might influence a Congressman in the area of
tax legislation to enact provisions that favor special groups or individuals. Id. at
1148. These factors arise from the political pressure that exists within the institutional framework in which tax legislation is passed. Id. at 1149-58. Members
of the taxing committees, who move up this institutional framework, are in a
position to make tax laws that favor a particular individual or group. Id. at 1155.
Pressures which influence committee decisions include pressure to continue historically recognized exemptions in favor of certain industries, and pressures

(1763)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 6 [1986], Art. 5

1764

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1: p. 1763

of the tax reform problem. In John Witte's recent study of income tax history he categorizes tax expenditures in some useful
ways. He goes on to conclude that those provisions providing
benefits for special groups account for only 2% of the total reve5
nue cost of tax expenditures.
An alternative view of the income tax malaise is presented by
contemplating the situation which surrounded the adoption of
the modern income tax in the United States. 6 At the time, the
income tax was a small pawn in the battles between the agrarian,
anti-tariff South and West and the moneyed Northeast. The income tax was not a polished academic product; it was a rough
alternative to still higher tariffs. Not even the contemporary legal
analysis was brilliant. Most lawyer efforts were devoted to insuring there was no violation of the constitutional prohibition
against direct taxes. The only reference to the meaning of direct
tax in Madison's Debates is, in its entirety, as follows: "Mr. King
asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No one
from those in high tax brackets to lower their burden coupled with a Congressional belief that such persons are paying too much tax. Id.
5. J. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
276-82 (1985). Witte places tax expenditures into the following six classifications: 1) need; 2) tax equity; 3) special group benefits; 4) general economic incentives; 5) specific economic incentives and 6) a miscellaneous category, which
contains those provisions that cannot easily be classified in any of the former
categories. Id. at 273. Witte's test for determining whether a tax provision falls
within the special group classifications is as follows: 1) the provision affects a
reasonably permanent and identifiable demographic or occupational group;
2) the economic conditions addressed by the provision cannot be assumed to be
exclusive to that group and 3) there is no overriding presumption that the benefit is being granted primarily on other grounds. Id. at 274. Examples of special
group benefits include exclusion of military benefits, expensing of farm capital
outlays and excess bad debt reserves for financial institutions. Id. at 278. Witte
recognizes the narrowness of his special group benefits category, but points out
that even if the group is expanded to include provisions from the various categories such as exemptions for the elderly, disability payments and interest on life
insurance, the percentage of total expenditures would only increase to 13%. Id.
at 285.
Thus, even if the broader definition is used, it is incorrect to perceive
the tax expenditure system as primarily a method of distributing hidden benefits to very narrow and highly organized groups .... As it is,
most of the money is spread very broadly among large segments of the
population and corporate world.
Id.
6. For a general history of the income tax, see R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1940); R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954);
S. RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1942). For a discussion of
the background surrounding the adoption of the income tax, see infra notes 8-15
and accompanying text.
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answered." '7
The concept of income was not clearly delineated when our
society was struggling with the problem of whether income
should be taxed. There was a general consensus that income was
the amount available for consumption without impairment of capital. 8 This definition was similar to that given by Adam Smith 135
years earlier 9 as well as to ideas developed in German literature in
the latter part of the nineteenth century.' 0 This whole approach
to defining income, which includes savings as a part of income is
basically consistent with the more elegant Haig-Simons definition
often cited today.1 1 A completely different definition which excluded the amount saved had been proposed by the American
economist Irving Fisher, however, Fisher himself thought his defi12
nition was not practical.
The method by which substantive statutory law is developed
is a chaotic political process which is rarely scientific. Moreover,
the circumstances surrounding the early income tax days were not
propitious for good legislation. The crucial background work had
not been done, staff work was negligible and the political payoff
3
was in "getting" the moneyed East, not in conceptual elegance.'
7. 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 451 (J. Elliot
ed. 1888).
8. E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (1911). Seligman wrote
his book while the income tax amendment was being considered.
9. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 123 (1863). Smith notes:

The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends the whole annual produce of their land and labor; the [net] revenue, what remains free to them after deducting the expense of
maintaining, first, their fixed and secondly, their circulating capital, or
what, without encroaching upon their capital, they can place in their
stock reserved for immediate consumption or spend upon their subsistence, conveniences, and amusements.
Id. at 124.
10. The German literature is discussed in H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 59-80 (1938). Two of the more prominent ideas of this time, that
were illustrative of other ideas in German tax literature of that period, were put
forth by Schanz and Hermann. Schanz's concept of income is stated in terms of
consumption and of property values at given moments in time. Id. at 62. Hermann, although having a view similar to that of Schanz, was concerned about
income from the viewpoint of social income as opposed to individual income.

d. at 63-64.
11. Id. at 50. Under the Haig-Simons definition, personal income is "defined as the algabraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." Id. at 50.
12. I. FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 134-35, 247-55 (1906).
13. SeeJ. WITrE, supra note 5, at 70-75. Witte writes that:
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The result was that we built some substantial booby traps into the
early income tax, original sins that would come back to haunt us.
Some of these are in principle reparable under the income tax
while others would be very difficult to change. Even where a mistake is reparable, it is hard to accomplish change after the mistake
has been in place for decades because interests have been created
and defensive institutions developed.14
Many of our apparently insoluble current tax problems were
born in the original sin of sloppy thinking about defining income
at a time when it was the subject of only a minor tax. Unfortunately, as the tax became major, its original sins resisted baptism.
The United States income tax did draw on the experience of
other countries, notably the United Kingdom and Germany,
which had long used the income tax. Professor Haig, writing in
1921, could praise the United States tax law as being "the closest
approach to true economic income yet achieved by any country." 15 We did avoid some of their errors (e.g., the omission of
capital gains) but we made plenty of our own.
Non-Cash Income
In 1915, an academic commentator, Professor Roy Blakey,
reviewed the Revenue Act of 1913.16 Anticipating the first round
of amendments, he wrote: "[t]he rental value of residences is one
of the forms of non-monetary income that it would be practicable
and desirable to include, though such an amendment to the rul'1 7
ings might well be postponed a year or two."
In 1915, this was not as silly a prediction as it sounds today.
One giving thought to the matter would realize that when a landThose instrumental in the passage of the tax were mostly from the Middle West and South.... The opposition came almost exclusively from
the East.... The debate that surrounded passage was magnificent, and
although the geoeconomic factors were raised, the issue was also posed
as one of rich versus poor and the rights of property versus the specter
of socialism.
Id. at 71; see also R. PAUL, supra note 6, at 32-39; S. RATNER, supra note 6, at 17484.
14. Surrey, supra note 4, at 1152-53. Professor Surrey notes that it often
takes several years for the mistakes of past tax acts to surface, and by that time,
the benefited group is well-entrenched and has many strategic advantages in
defending the legislation. Id.
15. R. Haig, The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAx 26 (R. Haig ed. 1921). Haig was specifically referring to the inclusion of capital gains in income.
16. Income Tax Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
17. R. Blakey, Amending the Federal Income Tax Act, 58 ANNALS 39 (1915).
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lord gives up a cash rent to move into the property, there should
be the same income and ability to pay; the only difference being
that the income is in the form of housing services, not cash.
Moreover, at that time, the United Kingdom, German and Australian income taxes included imputed rent in the tax base.1 8 Henry
Simons even quoted the German tax scholar, Georg Schanz, as
reporting that he knew only one jurisdiction (Mechlenburg)
where imputed rent was not taxed.' 9 Nevertheless, Congress understood better than did the Professors that their constituents
either didn't understand, or didn't want to understand imputed
rent.
After Congress made the erroneous decision not to tax imputed rent, it is not surprising that it enacted a law which allowed
deductions for the costs of this non-includable income, i.e., home
mortgage interest and property taxes on the residence. As indicated by the persistent tax shelter problem, the costs of such nontaxable income remains a subtle tax problem. 20
Once this set of home-owner benefits became established as
part of the tax law, it was obviously hard to eliminate them. It was
not that they were rational; it was simply that they were expected
by the taxpayer. It was not until well after society had been in the
business of encouraging home ownership that the arguments
about social utility started. Until 1942, when the income tax began to be converted from a class tax to a mass tax, the arguments
for encouraging home ownership did not even make sense. With
taxability limited to the top 5% of the population, the decisions of
those taxpayers to buy or rent should be respected. By 1921,
Professor Haig was attributing the development of the coopera18. H. SIMONS, supra note 10, at 44, 112 n.3. Simons stated the reason they
included imputed rent as taxable income was due to their acceptance of the idea
that income can be derived from things: "There is, first, and most common in
economic theory, the conception of what may be called incomefrom things. In this
sense, income may be conceived in terms of services derived from things or,
quantitatively, in terms of the market value." Id. at 44.
19. Id. at 112 n.3 (Simons references Schanz's work as Finanz Archiv 35
(1896)).
20. See THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 322-24 (1985) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS]. The President noted that
a clear reflection of income for tax purposes requires that the costs of
generating income be matched with the income actually earned. If a
current deduction is allowed for the cost of producing income that is
exempt from tax or includable in income on a deferred basis, the current deduction will offset other taxable income and thus eliminate or
defer tax.
Id. at 322.
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tive apartment institution in New York to the tax law. 2 1
The omission of imputed rent on owner-occupied homes was
only part of a wider pattern of ignoring non-cash income. The
historical roots of such omissions are not hard to ascertain. In the
early part of the twentieth century, one of the large aspects of
non-cash income was food which was produced and consumed on
farms. 22 As noted previously, the income tax grew out of an agricultural protest against the moneyed Northeast. The supporters
of the income tax were looking for an instrument with which to
burden the financial class, in order to relieve agriculture of some
of the burden of tariffs. 2 3 It would not have profited income tax
supporters to consider how much the agricultural industry relies
on non-cash income.
The orientation that income is cash is one of the basic defects
of the modern income tax. The difficulty of recognizing non-cash
income is certainly at the root of the scandalous amount of fringe
benefits that are excluded from income. 24 It is quite absurd to say
that exclusions for employer-paid health or term life insurance
25
are in the law as an incentive for the benefits of this insurance.
Term life insurance and health insurance premiums are not excluded when bought by individuals; they are favored because they
are employer-paid. The blind spot concerning non-cash income
was involved in the failure to tax imputed interest on life insurance reserves, as well as in the capital appreciation problem discussed in the next section.
21. R. Haig, supra note 15, at 24.
22. Similar to imputed rent on owner-occupied homes, this is an income
carried in the national income and product accounts.
23. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 493-95.
24. The fringe benefits that Congress permits to permanently bypass taxation can be categorized under the heading of employee fringe benefits. These
benefits include: 1) employer provided meals and lodging, I.R.C. § 119 (West
Supp. 1986); 2) employee health benefits and life insurance coverage, I.R.C.
§§ 79, 106 (West Supp. 1986) and 3) a broad category of statutorily-enumerated
employer-provided fringe benefits (any fringe benefit that qualifies as an employee benefit at no additional cost to the employer, an employee discount, a
working condition fringe or a de minimis fringe), I.R.C. § 132 (West Supp.
1986).
25. See S. GUERIN & P. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 178 (1986) ("To encourage employers to purchase life and
medical insurance for their employees, Congress has excluded from gross income amounts paid by the employer for such insurance."); THE PRESIDENT'S
PROPOSALS, supra note 20, at 24 ("Although this tax-based incentive for employee health insurance is an appropriate part of the national policy to encourage essential health care services, . . . the exclusion contributes
substantially to horizontal inequity and to higher than necessary marginal tax
rates.").
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The argument in this historical review is not to condemn
Congress for not taxing all non-cash incomes as much as it is to
bemoan the fact that this set of problems was not systematically
thought out. A reasonable compromise on housing would have
been to ignore imputed rent and disallow the mortgage interest
and home property tax deductions. This same problem was at
least thought about in the Civil War tax, in which a compromise
was reached whereby imputed rent was excluded and a deduction
26
allowed for rent paid on a residence.
Another area in which Congress has elected not to tax imputed income is where there is a real return on the investment in
such consumer durables as automobiles and televisions. It is
probably not practical to impute an income on such assets but we
should be aware that there exists non-taxable income regarding
such assets.2 7 The deduction of consumer installment loan interest is a problem largely because it is a cost of a non-includable
income.
In 1985, when the Treasury finally proposed limits on the exclusion of employer paid insurance benefits and on the deduction
of consumer interest, however, it was readily apparent that such
proposals were helpless before the entrenched lobbies of the unions and the health insurance companies.
CapitalAppreciation
For most of the history of the income tax, the majority of
serious students of tax have adhered to the Haig-Simons definition of income as the ultimate logic behind the income tax. 28 The
definition of income as consumption plus the increase of wealth
calls for taxing accrued but unrealized appreciation. Congress
could accept the theory of deducting accrued but unrealized de26. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469 (1865).
27. Imputed income is excluded from the income tax base. S. GUERIN & P.
POSTLEWAITE, supra note 25, at 86. There are two principal reasons for not taxing imputed income. First, the valuation difficulties regarding such situations,
and, second, the early misgivings about the constitutionality of taxing such income. Id. Imputed income arises when a taxpayer derives an economic benefit
from the ownership and use of his own property or when a taxpayer derives an
economic benefit from performing services for himself. Id. Where a taxpayer
derives an economic benefit from the ownership and use of his own goods, such
as his automobile or television (i.e., consumer durables), the rationale for considering such goods imputed income relates to the valuation difficulties that
arise or would arise in trying to assess what the dollar value of such benefits
would be.
28. B. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE &J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE
INCOME TAX BASE? A DEBATE 82-83 (1968).
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preciation but the other side of the logical coin was too far removed from accepted accounting practice. Again, the complaint
is not that there was no utopian solution to the problem; rather it
is that the problem was not thought through logically enough to
get to a reasonable compromise.
Early in the income tax, the issue of unrealized appreciation
came up for explicit consideration. In 1916 the Congress extended the income tax to stock dividends. 29 The issue was litigated in the famous case of Eisner v. Macomber3 0 in which the
Supreme Court held that income as intended by the sixteenth
amendment is "not a growth or increment of value in the investment;
but... something of exchangeable value proceedingfrom the property, severedfrom the capital . . . received or drawn by the recipient
(the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;-that is
3
income derived from property." '
Thus, on the basis of a weak argument, was the realization
principle born. It is interesting that the decision made more of an
impression on the Congress than it did on later judges. The
court decisions have moved away from a realization requirement
while the Congress has accepted it shamelessly while steadily ex32
panding the non-realization area.
It seems fair to say that Justice Pitney's view on income was
derived from an economist, Professor E.R.A. Seligman, who had
published an article on the subject in 1919. 33 Substantially the
same argument was published in a later work by that author, with
the footnote that it had been submitted to the Supreme Court as a
memorandum during consideration of Eisner.34 The Pitney decision contains several passages wherein the wording as well as the
argument is similar to the Seligman memorandum-article. 3 5 The
Seligman argument was an unsuccessful attempt to find a middle
ground between the Fisher view that limited income to consump29. Income Tax Act, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
30. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The majority opinion was written by Justice
Pitney; the case was a five-four decision.
31. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
32. J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATION OF GROSS INCOME 65-73 (1967).
33. E. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income? 9 AM. ECON. REV. 517 (1919).
Seligman notes: "[I]n a stock dividend there is neither separation [of earnings
from principal] nor realization, [therefore] the gain from a stock dividend is not
income." Id. at 536.
34. E. Seligman, Studies in Public Finance (1925), reprinted in REPRINTS OF

(1969).
35. REPRINTS OF ECONOMIC CLASSICS 98 (1969).

ECONOMIC CLASSICS
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tion and the more common view that included savings.3 6
Professor Haig, discussing the argument of his colleague Seligman, put his finger on the problem by pointing out that a cash
dividend also does not increase wealth. Income arises when the
corporation earns surplus which is a wealth increase for the shareholders. Whether this wealth is realized as increased value of one
share of stock, or as one share plus cash or as two shares is not
37
very significant.
Consider this case: A starts the year with $100 of stock in
company X which increases in fair market value during the year to
$200 at year end. B earns $100 from wages during the year and at
year end invests it in Stock X. Both A and B have advanced from
the year start by $100 worth of stock X. Logically, A and B have
38
the same ability to pay.
It may be conceded that annual valuation is an administrative
problem which argues for postponing tax on A's appreciation.
Logic tells us that A now has unrealized, as yet untaxed income.
Furthermore, if tax is not paid until realization, ,4 has a considerable interest advantage in tax postponement.
Legislators involved in the tax process, however, continued
to follow Justice Pitney's logic. There was no provision made for
ultimately taxing A's appreciation, even when the property has to
be valued anyway for death tax or for gift tax purposes.
Think about this case: A and B earn a basic wage from which,
after tax, they support themselves. A earns from a second job
$1,000,000 over his lifetime and saves $500,000 of it after taxes.
B has property which, during his lifetime, rises in value from zero
to $500,000 without being realized. At death both pay the same
36. I. FISHER, supra note 12, at 41.
37. R. Haig, supra note 15, at 8.
38. This argument is similar to several developed by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Eisner, 252 U.S. 189, 220-21, 226-27, 229-30 (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
This idea is developed more rigorously in G. Brannon, Euclid on Capital Gains, in
6 TAX NOTES 139 (1978).
In examining how a corporation can distribute its profits among its shareholders, Justice Brandeis argued in his Eisner dissent that regardless of the
method, there could be no question that the final effect was that the shareholder
had taxable income. 252 U.S. at 220-21, 226-27, (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis further noted that the result would be the same, i.e., taxable income to the shareholder, whether the corporation chooses to pay the dividend
through cash taken from surplus in its treasury or from distributing a stock dividend. Id. at 226-27 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis also argued that
it makes no difference in terms of the shareholder's taxable income whether a
stock dividend is paid in common as opposed to preferred stock. Id. at 229
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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estate tax, but A's wealth accumulation will have paid both income
and estate tax while B's will have avoided all income tax. There is
no rational reason for Congress to have legislated a different outcome in these situations.
If Congress had made any effort to follow through the simple
idea that appreciation must be income at some time, even if not
realizable when it accrues, then it would have acted differently in
a number of practical areas and we would have a more uniform
and lower-rate income tax. Certainly there would have been taxation of unrealized gains at death which would go a long way toward reducing the capital gains problem of lock-in.
For any given amount of tax burden to be imposed on transfers of property by death or gift, it would be fairer to raise more
of that tax from unrealized appreciation that has not paid income
tax and less from accumulations out of tax-paid income. The estate tax is for the most part a double tax on accumulated income
on which the decedent has paid income tax during his/her
lifetime.
Catching up on the postponed income tax after death is what
is done now with IRA's and pension plan distributions. Logically,
income in the form of appreciation, the recognition of which has
been postponed for tax purposes, is no different from income the
taxation of which has been postponed by some retirement pension arrangement.
There is a substantial interest advantage in the mere postponement of realization of capital gains. This might logically be
dealt with by increasing the inclusion rate for assets which have
been held a long time. 39 Congress regularly gives serious consideration to studies proving that lower taxes on realized gains increase tax revenues. However, little attention is given to the
substantial inducements available for non-realization, income tax
avoidance at death or effective tax reduction by tax postponement. It must be no surprise that in the face of these rewards for
non-realization, the taxpayers must be offered competing inducements on realization to make voluntary tax payment worthwhile.
39. Roger Brinner reaches a similar conclusion. R. BRINNER, Inflation and
the Definition of Taxable Personal Income, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (H.
Aaron ed. 1976). Brinner examines the issue of capital gains through recent
congressional proposals to adjust them for inflation. Id. at 145. Mr. Brinner
argues that the proposals are misguided in that they seek to answer the question
by reducing the proportion of gains subject to tax as their holding time increases. Id. He then concludes that the proper approach is to measure capital
gains and then tax them. Id.
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Improper treatment of unrealized gain is involved in a host
of narrower problems from gifts of appreciated property to charity to the General Utilities doctrine. 4 0 In all of these cases we have a
long-standing tax rule based on an incorrect analysis of income,
but a rule upon which various institutions have come to rely.
The extent to which this original sin is deeply ingrained in
the system can be seen from the utter futility of attempts to reform the system with respect to gains at death. Administration
proposals have been rejected out of hand by Congress (notably in
1964) and the one sorry attempt that passed Congress, carryover
basis, was shortly thereafter repealed. 4 1 In the Treasury's superb
base-broadening report in 1984, the appreciation at death issue
42
was not even mentioned.
40. The General Utilities doctrine is an exception to the two-level taxation of
corporate earnings (corporate earnings from sales of appreciated property are
taxed twice, first to the corporation when the sale occurs, and again to the shareholder when the net proceeds are distributed as dividends). General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 202 (1935).
The General Utilities rule permits non-recognition of gain by corporations on certain distributions of appreciated property (footnote omitted) to their shareholders and on certain liquidating sales of property.
Thus, its effect is to allow appreciation in property accruing during the
period it was held by a corporation to escape tax of the corporate level.
At the same time, the transferee (the shareholder or third party purchaser) obtains a stepped up, fair market value basis under other provisions of the Code, with associated additional depreciation, depletion,
or amortization deductions.
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1985).
41. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(a), 90 Stat. 1525,
1872 (repealed by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299). The legislative history indicates that the earlier provision was repealed because administrators were faced with a significant
increase in the time required to administer an estate, which resulted in a rise in
the overall cost of administration. In addition, Congress felt that the 1976 provisions were unduly complicated to apply. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
410, 530.
Congress did, however, reinstitute carryover basis for one limited situation.
See I.R.C. § 1014(e) (West Supp. 1986). Congress felt that preserving a steppedup basis would allow an heir to transfer appreciated property to a decedent immediately prior to death, and receive it back at the decedent's death with a
higher basis. Therefore, the stepped-up basis rules do not apply "with respect
to appreciated property acquired by the decedent through gift within [one year]
of death where such property passes from the decedent to the original donor or
the donor's spouse." The rule applies regardless of the format of the bequest by
the decedent to the donor. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 188-89
(1981).
42. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 1 TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

100 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY I].
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Intergovernmental Relations
Another area of original sin is provided by the area of intergovernmental relations. At the time of the sixteenth amendment,
the courts and the Congress were still mesmerized by the language in McCulloch v. Maryland43 that "an unlimited power to tax
involves, necessarily, a power to destroy." 4 4 Lots of good things,
if abused, have the power to destroy. By the 1930's, the courts
came to a view that was more oriented to results than to potential.
The new view was that there was no constitutional reason to exempt states and localities from general tax laws that would apply
to others in the same circumstances. 45 Exempting states from a
general tax constitutes an indirect subsidy.
The federal income tax got off on the wrong foot by exempting both interest and wages paid by states and localities. It is
slightly curious that when the Court saw the error of its ways in
the cases involving wages and state sales taxes, 46 there developed
federal taxation of state and local payment for labor services but
not payment for capital services. It may have been that prior to
1942 not many wage earners paid income tax anyway so the wage
exemption did not mean much. It may also have been significant
that these workers were not organized.
After the wage case, the Supreme Court did not have occasion to review the constitutionality of a federal income tax on municipal bond interest. Here can be seen the weight of a dead hand
that makes tax reform difficult. In 1959, a life insurance company
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
44. Id. at 327.
45. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934). The Court held that state activities not regarded as carrying on a strictly governmental function are not exempt from federal taxation. Id. at 369. In Ohio v. Helvering, the Court applied
the principle to a state liquor business. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, stated:
If a state chooses to go into the business of buying and selling commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right is not the
performance of a governmental function, and must find its support in
some authority apart from the police power. When a state enters the
market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty
pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at least, as the
taxing power of the federal government is concerned.
Id.; see also Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (officers of a state (Massachusetts) railroad were subject to federal income tax).
46. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (state sales tax applies
to purchase of materials by one who uses them even where federal government
reimburses purchaser); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (salaries of
state employees subject to federal income tax).
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tax statute was passed which involved a proration formula, disallowing part of the reserve interest deduction to the extent of investment income from exempt sources. 4 7 Litigation was expected
on the constitutional grounds that this statute effectively taxed exempt interest. For many in the Congress, the problem was not
the tax on life insurance companies but the possibility that the
Court would decide that the formula did tax exempt interest and
that it was not unconstitutional for the federal government to do
so. The "solution" was to add language to the bill to the effect
that it was not the intention of Congress to tax exempt interest
and if the formula should be interpreted to do so then it should
be changed appropriately. 48 The sole function of the language
was to foreclose the Court from considering whether Congress
could tax this interest. The myth of unconstitutionality is part of
the defense used to maintain this original sin.
Certainly, the bond community, as well as the state and local
governments, have fought hard to preserve the legacy of intergovernmental immunity. It is so well entrenched that states and
localities can, on a large scale, sell their immunity to private
investors.
This history would seem to apply to the deduction for state
and local taxes, which goes back to the 1861 Act. 49 In tax theory,
one might make a case for the appropriateness of income tax deductions but not for deduction of sales and property taxes. Nor is
there any good economic argument for exempting the income of
state-owned business enterprises. The explanations must lie in
the whole line of muddled thinking about intergovernmental immunity. The die cast long ago has prevailed, resulting in rejec50
tion of the 1984-85 Treasury proposals.
47. See Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 8669, 73 Stat. 112.
48. Id.
49. Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292.
50. See 2 TREASURY I, supra note 42, at 135-37. Both the 1984 and 1985
proposals of President Reagan sought to accomplish the following: 1) limit the
tax exemption for interest on state and local obligations to matters involving
financing governmental activities, such as schools and building roads; 2) eliminate the federal income tax exemption for nongovernmental bonds issued in the
future; 3) lighten restrictions on arbitrage with respect to tax-exempt obligations
and 4) repeal the general stock ownership corporation provisions. Id.; see also
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 20, at 281-93; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, §§ 1301, 1303, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.)
518-74. Section 1301 amends I.R.C. § 103 in the following manner:
(a) ExcLuSION.-Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does
not include interest on any State or local bond. (b) ExcEPnoNs.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to-
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Inflation Adjustment
A somewhat different kind of original sin problem is the matter of whether to tax real or money income. As we read the history, this problem received little attention in the early income tax
days. Professor Haig, for example, mentions the problem but he
saw little prospect for solution. He observed that there was not
51
even a satisfactory price index.
Jacob Viner wrote an exploratory article in the early 1920's
that was concerned primarily with identifying the various pricerelated problems that the author thought had been ignored. Interestingly, Viner did not identify the distortions related to
52
debt.
As inflation returned after World War II and in the 1970's,
there was sporadic talk about indexing basis for purposes of depreciation or capital gains. However, in the end, inflation was
merely cited as one reason for a speeded-up depreciation rate, or
a lower inclusion rate for capital gains which were both inappropriate solutions which overlooked the countervailing inflation
gain when an asset is financed by debt.
A conference at Brookings in 1976 highlighted the ambiguity
of whether business was overtaxed or undertaxed by inflation and
revealed the disagreement among the experts about what would
53
be the best solution.
The Treasury proposal to index interest was the first serious
(1) PRIVATE ACTIVITY BOND WHICH IS NOT A QUALIFIED BOND.Any private activity bond which is not a qualified bond (within
meaning of section 141.)
(2) ARBITRAGE BOND.-Any arbitrage bond (within the meaning of
section 148.)
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1301, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (100 Stat.) 518.
Section 1303 indicates that only some provisions relating to general stock
ownership corporations are repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Id.
§ 1303.
51. R. Haig, supra note 15, at 17.
52. J. Viner, Taxes and Price Levels, J. OF POL. ECON. 1923.
53. For a collection of the papers presented at the Brookings Institute conference, see INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (H. Aaron ed. 1976). Participants
of the conference noted:
When inflation begins, an inflation-adjusted tax law would initially
cause the average nonfinancial firm to pay more taxes than under current law. Over the long run, however, the inflation-adjusted tax law
would result in lower taxes than under current law, with an average
reduction in taxes of over one-half of 1 percent of assets if inflation
averages 10 percent a year.
Tideman & Tucker, The Tax Treatment of Business Profitsunder Inflationary Conditions,
in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra, at 34.
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proposal made to Congress attempting to deal with the debt side
of the inflation adjustment. 54 It was not surprising that this proposal proved not to be very good. The inflation adjustment itself
was too arbitrary and there was not enough attention to the subtle
ways that interest can appear in accounts. A bank, for example,
pays interest by undercharging for checking services; the Treasury's formula adjustment to the interest deduction would not
reach this interest.
Part of the Treasury proposal to remove the inflation distortion related to debt was to apply a formula to the interest deduction and to identify part of it as true interest and part of it as
repayment of debt. 5 5 The Treasury felt, however, that it was not
judicious to disallow part of the deduction for home mortgage
interest-a hangover from the other original sin of not dealing
with imputed rent on owner-occupied homes. The omission of
home mortgage interest significantly increases the tax favoritism
56
for housing investment.
The author's reading is that only now is there beginning to
develop an interest to solve the inflation problem. The matter
has so long been ignored that little background is available, even
to establish that the problem is solvable in the context of an income tax. It may be that the only way to deal with real income is
by way of consumption taxation.
Savings and Investment
In addition to the problems related to appreciation and realization, the decision to follow a definition of income that includes
savings has created another problem within the income tax. This
difficulty shows up in the endless line of proposals to provide incentives for one or another kind of savings or investment. Ostensibly, these proposals relate to some perceived capital shortage
but their roots are deep in the particular kind of income tax that
was originally adopted.
One complication is that the traditional income tax imposes a
double burden on income saved; it taxes both the savings and the
return on savings. Income of $100 used for current consumption
is reduced by a 50% tax to $50. That income could have been
saved and invested at 6% to provide $200 of consumption in ten
54. See 1 TREASURY I, supra note 42, at 111.
55. See id. at 111, 114.
56. P. Hendershott, Tax Reform and FinancialMarkets, in
QUENCES OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION 167 (1985).

ECONOMIC CONSE-
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years. A 50% tax reduces the initial investment to $50 and the
growth rate to 3% so final consumption is reduced more than
50% to about $72. One can quibble about whether this is really
double taxation, but it is a fact that increasingly in the last three
decades, there have been expressions of national concern that not
enough income was saved and invested. Consequently, there has
been developed a panoply of savings and investment incentives.
A second complication is that there exists an income tax
which not only disregards borrowing, as negative saving, but at
the same time encourages borrowing by the interest deduction in
excess of investment income. The response to the capital
"shortage" has been a mishmash of incentives which are not fully
compatible with the system that exists.
There exist savings incentives that apply where the appearance of saving has been created by borrowing even when there
are no savings. Banks brazenly announce that they will lend individuals money to buy an IRA. The tax favoritism for individual
life insurance is structured not to benefit insurance as such but
saving in life insurance policies. There is an almost unlimited op57
portunity to acquire the savings by borrowing.
Our other approach to dealing with the capital shortage is by
a variety of incentives for savings to be invested in particular
ways. One justification for such incentives is the pre-existing incentive to housing investment noted earlier. 5 8 These incentives
are so irregular between different types of investment that they
create a massive inefficiency simply by the investment distortions
that they introduce. Assume that competitive investments return
15% after tax. It will be profitable for a taxpayer to invest in an
11% opportunity which is tax free. The fact that some of the society's scarce capital was invested at 11% rather than 15% means
that four points of return were wasted, simply thrown away.
There is extensive economic literature on this matter of excess
59
burden.
Use of a tax-free return in this illustration was not exaggerated. Under an income tax, a combination of fast write-off and
57. Cf L. Shepard, Minimum Deposit Life Insurance. The Seven-Year Itch, 29
TAX NOTES 539 (1985) (Policy holder of "minimum deposit" life insurance policies can engage in tax arbitrage by borrowing the entire cash value of the policy,
deducting interest on the loan and making fairly small premium payments).
58. For a discussion of the pre-existing incentive to housing investment, see
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. See E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 288-302 (1979); A. HARBERGER, TAXATION AND WELFARE (1974).
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investment credit is equivalent to expensing which in turn is
equivalent to zero tax on the return. An investment costing $100
with a before-tax return of $10 produces 10%. Immediate expensing against a 46% tax means that the cost to the investor is
$54 and the annual return after a 10% tax will be $5.40 or still
10%. In the income tax of 1982, the equivalent of expensing was
not unusual. 60 Some authors commenting on the Treasury tax
reform plan argued that the efficiency gain from merely making
the investment incentives more nearly uniform would more than
offset the considerable reduction in overall investment
61
incentive.
A tax on consumption, or on income in the Fisher definition,
achieves the results of the investment savings incentives more
uniformly and without the spurious savings problem encountered
with borrowing. This whole set of complications is attributable to
Congress taking a wrong road at the very beginning in legislating
the income tax.
Other Sins
There are a number of other sets of current tax problems,
which will be mentioned only briefly, that can be traced to sloppy
thinking in the early days of the income tax. The original framers
were correct in concluding that income once taxed as it entered
the family should not be taxed again simply because the earner
transfers normal consumption rights to another family member.
This original gift exclusion was, however, too broadly written and
led to such foolishness as the non-taxation of social security benefits and to a long line of litigation and legislation on business
gifts.

62

60. Economic Report of the President, H.R. Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
83 (1985).
61. J. Gravelle & M. Boskin, The Business Tax Issue: Two Views, 29 TAX NOTES
651 (1985).
62. Benefits under Federal Social Security legislation are administratively
excluded by way of interpretation of the relevant provision. See I.R.C. § 86
(West Supp. 1986); Rev. Rul. 217, 1970-1 C.B. 12. However, § 86 does require
inclusion of some benefits in gross income. Specifically, the portion of social
security benefits to be included in an individual's gross income is the lesser of
one-half of the total social security benefits received during the taxable year or
one-half of the amount by which the sum of the taxpayer's "modified adjusted
gross income" plus one-half of social security benefits received exceed a specific
basic amount. I.R.C. § 86(a), (b) (West Supp. 1986). In effect, where the recipient's income both from social security benefits and through other means exceeds the statutorily designated amount, then the benefits are included in gross
income; gifts, however, remain excluded. See I.R.C. § 102 (West Supp. 1986).
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The double taxation of corporate dividends can certainly be
attributed to sloppy thinking about the relation of corporations
and their shareholders under the income tax. There are other
examples, which will not be mentioned in this paper.
Lessons
The argument developed to this point has some obvious lessons for various proposals to reform the income tax. One set of
lessons that the author finds compelling is apparent in the hope63
lessness of the big reform packages such as Bradley-Gephardt,
66
Kemp-Kasten, 6 4 Treasury 165 and the President's Proposals.
From the standpoint of serious analysis of the problems of income tax, they are essentially gimmicks that move tax burdens
around with principal concern for political appeal, i.e., having
more winners than losers.
Certainly the most thoughtful of these proposed reforms was
Treasury J.67 On the most basic of all the fundamentals, whether
to draft Treasury I to tax income or consumption, the die was cast
for income on the expedient grounds of having a plan on timethat a repair job on the income tax was better suited to the political time table. 6 8 The serious problem of owner-occupied hous69
ing was taken off the agenda before reform planning started.
The key problem in the area of capital gains and realization, the
treatment of appreciation at death, was never mentioned.
Creditably, the Treasury I plan was ahead of the others in its
effort to deal with non-taxed fringe benefits. Failure to tax non63. S. 409, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 800, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985). The Bradley-Gephardt bill, known as the Fair Tax Act of 1985, proposed to broaden the base of the individual and corporate income taxes, to
significally reduce tax rates, to smooth out the tax schedules of the individual
income tax and to simplify the tax laws by eliminating most credits, deductions
and exclusions.
64. S. 2600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). This bill, known as the Fair and
Simple Tax Act of 1984, was introduced by Senator Kasten as a method of reducing tax rates in a manner that is fair to all taxpayers and simplifying the tax
laws by eliminating most credits, deductions and exclusions. Id.
65. TREASURY I, supra note 42. TREASURY I is a three-volume report on fundamental simplification and tax reform proposed by the Treasury Department to
the President in November 1984
66. See PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 20. The President proposed to
reduce tax rates, reduce complexity, increase fairness and increase growth.
67. For a thorough discussion of Treasury I, see McLure, Where Tax Reform
went Astray 32 VILL. L. REV. 1619 (1986).
68. C. McLure, Jr., Rationale Underlying Treasury Proposals, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAX SIMPLIFICATIONS, supra note 56, at 35.
69. Id. at 37.
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cash incomes was one of the original sins in our tax system. 70
Dealing with this required a basic effort to put across the idea that
the economy will operate more efficiently if no particular form of
income is favored over any other. This idea is not a matter of
providing a tax reduction to a favored group, it is a matter of allowing people to make unbiased decisions about how to receive
salary.
The Reagan tax reform was presented as massive tax reduction for most people, financed by closing loopholes that applied
to special groups, mostly corporations. This was essentially a bidding-for-popularity strategy that was open to counter-attacks
from the sellers of fringe benefits, the insurance companies, who
encouraged taxpayers: "Do not let them take your benefits away.
Write your Congressman." It was also subject to attacks that taxing fringe benefits was regressive.
The other theme exploited to push tax reform was simplicity. 7 ' Obviously, taxing non-cash income does not make for simplicity, but this is irrelevant. In no logical sense can simplicity
alone be held up as a goal for tax policy. One can talk about
achieving a given level of fairness and efficiency more simply or
making trade-offs between simplicity and fairness or efficiency,
but simplicity by itself is an inadequate goal.
A serious strategic approach to tax reform would be to emphasize deregulation and freedom rather than rate reduction. It
would have been possible to lay it on the line: "We must have an
average tax of so and so. Not taxing fringes means that we must
tax cash more heavily. There is no tax reduction either way."
Another kind of lesson that can be pursued is the importance
of beginnings in any tax system. The arena of tax legislation is a
poor place for learning by doing or by on-the-job training. The
system does not forgive the making of a mistake.
It is certainly a possibility that within the next few years we
will initiate a new tax form in the United States focusing on a
broad based direct comsumption tax ("DCT"). I see a great reluctance to increase income tax rates, while at the same time the
tax base erosion is likely to continue. There will be demand for a
new revenue source to deal with the deficits.
70. For a discussion of the failure to tax non-cash items, see supra notes 627 and accompanying text.

71. See

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS,

supra note 20, at 115-16. The President

proposed a return-free tax system in which specified taxpayers could elect to
have the Internal Revenue Service compute the taxpayer's liability based on
withholding and information reports provided to the Service. Id. at 115.
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The obvious forms of DCT are retail sales, the Europeanstyle value-added tax collected by the credit method, and a business transfer tax which is a value-added tax collected by the deduction method. 7 2 All of these differ mainly in collection
technique and could, in principle, be equally comprehensive.
They also differ in some relatively technical ways which are not
relevant at the level of basic discussion that I will pursue.
A major problem with any DCT will be regressivity, or the
impact on poor people. A popular but improper way of handling
this regressivity is to exclude from the tax base alleged necessities
such as food and drugs. In the first place, these categories are
basically undefinable, so the difficulties of identifying specific exempt products would be endless. In the second place, food and
drugs, as such, are not necessities. A certain amount of food is a
necessity but then a certain amount of many things are necessities. A considerable amount of food is a luxury or at least a
comfort.
A straightforward way to deal with the matter of regressivity
or necessities is to provide to everyone a refund of the amount of
DCT attributable to expenditures on a poverty level of consumption. This is the practical equivalent of personal exemptions and
a zero bracket amount in the income tax. The refund procedure,
moreover, is the one that comes close to a logical concept of necessities. The refund approach probably lacks one of the appeals
of exemptions, viz., it does enlist the lobby support of industries
such as the food business, that would also benefit from
exemptions.
Several DCT bills introduced in the United States provide for
the food and other "necessity" exemptions, an approach which is
common in Europe. It would be a fatal mistake to start off with
this set of complications in a new tax, but that is likely to happen
73
if decisions are made quickly in the political process.
From the income tax experience that the author has re72. See Doernberg, A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70 IOWA L. REV.
425 (1985). Doernberg explores the feasibility of a flat rate consumption tax
that is tax-neutral towards savings and consumption decisions faced by
taxpayers.
73. For a collection of papers presented at a conference on the experience
of six European countries with value-added tax, see THE VALUE-ADDED TAX:
LESSONS FROM EUROPE (H. Aaron ed. 1981). In an introduction, the editor notes
that the "value-added tax should not be regarded as a tax panacea or a simply
surgical device for extracting revenue painlessly from the body politic. Rather,
its desirability should be considered within the context of a larger debate on tax
structure." Id. at 17.
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counted, one of the areas of particular trouble was the treatment
of owner-occupied housing. 74 The same problem arises in regard
to imputed income from other consumer durables. 75 These
problems are quite manageable in the context of a DCT.
There is in the public finance literature a remarkable parallel:
a continuing tax on an income stream is substantially equivalent
to a one-time tax at the same rate on the capital value of that
stream. At a 10% interest rate a stream of payments of $10 a year
is worth $100. A stream of taxes of 20% of the income, i.e., $2 a
year has a current value of 20% of $100.
The tax on imputed rent could be substantially discharged by
treating the purchase of a house as a fully-taxable event under a
DCT, or equivalently as treating the payment of interest and principle on a home mortgage as taxable. The one-time tax on the
purchase price would appear to be a burden, but obviously it
could be financed in the mortgage as well as those parts of the
house cost attributable to local building codes designed to enrich
local builders. There is a transition problem connected with previously-acquired homes which could be solved by a one-time tax
on the capital value at the start of DCT.
Once one begins to explore this line of argument, refinements could be developed. It would be elegant to have periodic
reassessments and tax increase of capital values to get imputed
rents not foreseen in the initial purchase price. On sale of the
home, one should refund the tax rate times the sale price to the
extent of previously taxed capital value. The ability to invent refined calculations could easily outstrip the ability of the system to
handle complications. The author's argument is that an intelligent initial approach to the problem of drafting a new tax would
reveal considerable resources for doing things correctly. Out of
these, reasonable compromises could be fashioned in contrast to
the horrors created under the income tax.
Under a DCT, I
would think it realistic to come very close to the right answer on
consumer durables other than housing. Furthermore, one would
expect that the chances are good for getting a much better result
on housing than exists under the current income tax. In the
value-added tax bill which he introduced several years ago, Mr.
Ullman would have provided a tax at half-rate on the initial
74. For a discussion of the treatment of owner-occupied housing, see supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the problems with regard to imputed income, see
supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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purchase price of housing. 76
Another area that would require careful early planning under
a DCT would be the matter of intergovernmental relations. One
could argue that a decision to consume public schooling should
be burdened with the same tax as the decision to consume private
schooling. As investments, there is a good case for making the
tax zero in both cases. Other state and local services would seem
to be more clearly consumption. A particular function would ordinarily bear tax to the extent that it involved buying goods from
the private sector. Complete taxation would require an additional tax for the value added by state and local government employees. This would be one of the more difficult areas of DCT
design.
Another area calling for special effort in a DCT is the application to financial institutions. This area seemed so complicated
that it was left out of the coverage of the European value-added
taxes. Generally, financial institutions are treated by some other
tax, such as a premium tax, in states that have retail sales taxes.
In theory, the loading charge in insurance is the proper base for a
consumption tax in insurance (not the premium) and the service
charges, whether or not paid out of investment income, is the
proper base for banks. The financial area is one in which forethought will pay dividends. Significantly, the volume of the
Treasury's 1984 Tax Reform report dealing with the value-added
tax indicated some hopelessness about applying a DCT to
financials. 7 7 Recent academic research, however, has indicated
that this is quite feasible.
The lesson of income tax experience is that there is little opportunity to construct detailed tax rules wisely and then only
when the tax is new. It does not seem accurate to say that any
new tax in the United States will quickly fall prey to the special
interest exceptions that bedevil the income tax. For the most
part, these can be traced back to errors in the original formulation
of the income tax. The trick is to be more careful with any new
tax which Congress sees fit to adopt.
76. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, H.R. 5665, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
77. See 3 TREASURY I, supra note 42. Volume 3 of Treasury I considers the
issues involved in deciding whether the United States should adopt a national
sales tax. For the Treasury Department's discussion of the complex problems of
applying the value-added tax to financial institutions, see id. at 49-53.
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Postscript
This article was written before the Senate Finance Committee's breakthrough that led to the adoption of the tax reform legislation in 1986.78 The pessimism expressed in the article about
tax reform was overstated but the amount of real reform accomplished was modest.
On the individual side there was real improvement in the limitation of the interest deduction, and the deduction for state sales
taxes.7 9 The limitation on tax shelter losses and the minimum
taxes offend logic by making the treatment of certain transactions
conditional on circumstances irrelevant to the transaction itself.8 0
On the business side, there was a significant increase in the
double tax on saving and investment offset by greater equality between various investments, e.g., repeal of the investment tax
credit. 8 ' One would expect from prior income tax history that
this will not prove to be a permanent solution and we will soon be
talking about policies to increase investment.
It was disappointing, but not unexpected that no progress
was made toward taxing fringe benefits.8 2
78. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.

AD.

CODE CONG.

&

(100 Stat.).
79. See id. §§ 134, 511(b), 1986 U.S.
NEWS

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (100 Stat.)
32, 160-65. Section 511(b) amends I.R.C. § 163(h) (West Supp. 1986) by disallowing the deduction for personal interest of individuals. Id. § 511 (b). Section
134 repeals the deduction for state and local sales taxes. Id. at § 134.
80. See id. § 501. Section 501 amends the Tax Code by adding a new section which limits the losses and credits from passive activities. Id.
81. See id. § 211. The regular investment tax credit is repealed for property
placed in service after December 31, 1985. Id. Under the provisions of a new
§ 49, the investment tax credit continues to apply to certain property, including
property covered by transition rules. Id.
82. See I.R.C. § 132 (West Supp. 1986).
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